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Curiosity-driven Exploration by Self-supervised Prediction

Deepak Pathak, Pulkit Agrawal, Alexei A. Efros, Trevor Darrell
arXiv·2017
In many real-world scenarios, rewards extrinsic to the agent are extremely sparse, or absent altogether. In such cases, curiosity can serve as an intrinsic reward signal to enable the agent to explore its environment and learn skills that might be useful later in its life. We formulate curiosity as the error in an agent's ability to predict the consequence of its own actions in a visual feature space learned by a self-supervised inverse dynamics model. Our formulation scales to high-dimensional continuous state spaces like images, bypasses the difficulties of directly predicting pixels, and, critically, ignores the aspects of the environment that cannot affect the agent. The proposed approach is evaluated in two environments: VizDoom and Super Mario Bros. Three broad settings are investigated: 1) sparse extrinsic reward, where curiosity allows for far fewer interactions with the environment to reach the goal; 2) exploration with no extrinsic reward, where curiosity pushes the agent to explore more efficiently; and 3) generalization to unseen scenarios (e.g. new levels of the same game) where the knowledge gained from earlier experience helps the agent explore new places much faster than starting from scratch. Demo video and code available at https://pathak22.github.io/noreward-rl/
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Position: Episodic Memory is the Missing Piece for Long-Term LLM Agents

Mathis Pink, Qinyuan Wu, Vy Ai Vo, Javier Turek, Jianing Mu, Alexander Huth, Mariya Toneva
arXiv·2025
As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve from text-completion tools into fully fledged agents operating in dynamic environments, they must address the challenge of continually learning and retaining long-term knowledge. Many biological systems solve these challenges with episodic memory, which supports single-shot learning of instance-specific contexts. Inspired by this, we present an episodic memory framework for LLM agents, centered around five key properties of episodic memory that underlie adaptive and context-sensitive behavior. With various research efforts already partially covering these properties, this position paper argues that now is the right time for an explicit, integrated focus on episodic memory to catalyze the development of long-term agents. To this end, we outline a roadmap that unites several research directions under the goal to support all five properties of episodic memory for more efficient long-term LLM agents.
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AlphaEvolve: A Gemini-powered coding agent for designing advanced algorithms - Google DeepMind

DeepMind
DeepMind Blog·2025
New AI agent evolves algorithms for math and practical applications in computing by combining the creativity of large language models with automated evaluators
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AidanBench: Evaluating Novel Idea Generation on Open-Ended Questions | OpenReview

Aidan McLaughlin, Anuja Uppuluri, James Campbell
openreview.net·2024
AidanBench evaluates large language models (LLMs) on their ability to generate novel ideas in response to open-ended questions, focusing on creativity, reliability, contextual attention, and instruction following. Unlike benchmarks with clear-cut answers, AidanBench assesses models in more open-ended, real-world tasks. Testing several state-of-the-art LLMs, it shows weak correlation with existing benchmarks while offering a more nuanced view of their performance in open-ended scenarios.
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A Nice Worksheet

Dylan Kane
Substack·2023
And a short rant about how worksheets are unfairly maligned
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Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments

Ivan Geffner, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
arXiv·2025
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson and Wilkie showed that side contracting can backfire: even a game with a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium can devolve into inefficient equilibria once unbounded, simultaneous commitments are allowed. The root cause is a prisoner's dilemma effect, where each player can exploit her commitment power to reshape the equilibrium in her favor, harming overall welfare. To circumvent this problem we introduce a \emph{staged-commitment} protocol. Players may pledge transfers only in small, capped increments over multiple rounds, and the phase continues only with unanimous consent. We prove that, starting from any finite game $Γ$ with a non-degenerate Nash equilibrium $\vecσ$, this protocol implements every welfare-maximizing payoff profile that \emph{strictly} Pareto-improves $\vecσ$. Thus, gradual and bounded commitments restore the full efficiency potential of side payments while avoiding the inefficiencies identified by Jackson and Wilkie.
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Constrained deep learning for pricing and hedging european options in incomplete markets

Nicolas Baradel
arXiv·2025
In incomplete financial markets, pricing and hedging European options lack a unique no-arbitrage solution due to unhedgeable risks. This paper introduces a constrained deep learning approach to determine option prices and hedging strategies that minimize the Profit and Loss (P&L) distribution around zero. We employ a single neural network to represent the option price function, with its gradient serving as the hedging strategy, optimized via a loss function enforcing the self-financing portfolio condition. A key challenge arises from the non-smooth nature of option payoffs (e.g., vanilla calls are non-differentiable at-the-money, while digital options are discontinuous), which conflicts with the inherent smoothness of standard neural networks. To address this, we compare unconstrained networks against constrained architectures that explicitly embed the terminal payoff condition, drawing inspiration from PDE-solving techniques. Our framework assumes two tradable assets: the underlying and a liquid call option capturing volatility dynamics. Numerical experiments evaluate the method on simple options with varying non-smoothness, the exotic Equinox option, and scenarios with market jumps for robustness. Results demonstrate superior P&L distributions, highlighting the efficacy of constrained networks in handling realistic payoffs. This work advances machine learning applications in quantitative finance by integrating boundary constraints, offering a practical tool for pricing and hedging in incomplete markets.
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Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them

Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer
arXiv·2025
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium selection. We study the computational complexity of identifying and using symmetries. Using the classical framework of normal-form games, we consider game symmetries that can be across some or all players and/or actions. We find a strong connection between game symmetries and graph automorphisms, yielding graph automorphism and graph isomorphism completeness results for characterizing the symmetries present in a game. On the other hand, we also show that the problem becomes polynomial-time solvable when we restrict the consideration of actions in one of two ways. Next, we investigate when exactly game symmetries can be successfully leveraged for Nash equilibrium computation. We show that finding a Nash equilibrium that respects a given set of symmetries is PPAD- and CLS-complete in general-sum and team games respectively -- that is, exactly as hard as Brouwer fixed point and gradient descent problems. Finally, we present polynomial-time methods for the special cases where we are aware of a vast number of symmetries, or where the game is two-player zero-sum and we do not even know the symmetries.
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Exploring Mechanistic Interpretability in Large Language Models: Challenges, Approaches, and Insights | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore

Unknown Author
ieeexplore.ieee.org·2025
Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their performance across a wide array of tasks. However, the lack of interpretabilit
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The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games

Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer
arXiv·2024
Imperfect-recall games, in which players may forget previously acquired information, have found many practical applications, ranging from game abstractions to team games and testing AI agents. In this paper, we quantify the utility gain by endowing a player with perfect recall, which we call the value of recall (VoR). While VoR can be unbounded in general, we parameterize it in terms of various game properties, namely the structure of chance nodes and the degree of absentmindedness (the number of successive times a player enters the same information set). Further, we identify several pathologies that arise with VoR, and show how to circumvent them. We also study the complexity of computing VoR, and how to optimally apportion partial recall. Finally, we connect VoR to other previously studied concepts in game theory, including the price of anarchy. We use that connection in conjunction with the celebrated smoothness framework to characterize VoR in a broad class of games.
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Truthful AI: Developing and governing AI that does not lie

Owain Evans, Owen Cotton-Barratt, Lukas Finnveden, Adam Bales, Avital Balwit, Peter Wills, Luca Righetti, William Saunders
arXiv·2021
In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.
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Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI

Lewis Hammond, Alan Chan, Jesse Clifton, Jason Hoelscher-Obermaier, Akbir Khan, Euan McLean, Chandler Smith, Wolfram Barfuss, Jakob Foerster, Tomáš Gavenčiak, The Anh Han, Edward Hughes, Vojtěch Kovařík, Jan Kulveit, Joel Z. Leibo, Caspar Oesterheld, Christian Schroeder de Witt, Nisarg Shah, Michael Wellman, Paolo Bova, Theodor Cimpeanu, Carson Ezell, Quentin Feuillade-Montixi, Matija Franklin, Esben Kran, Igor Krawczuk, Max Lamparth, Niklas Lauffer, Alexander Meinke, Sumeet Motwani, Anka Reuel, Vincent Conitzer, Michael Dennis, Iason Gabriel, Adam Gleave, Gillian Hadfield, Nika Haghtalab, Atoosa Kasirzadeh, Sébastien Krier, Kate Larson, Joel Lehman, David C. Parkes, Georgios Piliouras, Iyad Rahwan
arXiv·2025
The rapid development of advanced AI agents and the imminent deployment of many instances of these agents will give rise to multi-agent systems of unprecedented complexity. These systems pose novel and under-explored risks. In this report, we provide a structured taxonomy of these risks by identifying three key failure modes (miscoordination, conflict, and collusion) based on agents' incentives, as well as seven key risk factors (information asymmetries, network effects, selection pressures, destabilising dynamics, commitment problems, emergent agency, and multi-agent security) that can underpin them. We highlight several important instances of each risk, as well as promising directions to help mitigate them. By anchoring our analysis in a range of real-world examples and experimental evidence, we illustrate the distinct challenges posed by multi-agent systems and their implications for the safety, governance, and ethics of advanced AI.
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